A newly released video from We The People USA Alliance has intensified questions about a software installation inside the Maricopa County Tabulation and Election Center, with the report placing the activity on October 7. The broader report also raises concerns about USB devices, unsecured ports, secure keys and a cell phone inside the facility.
The first video, made public by The Gateway Pundit on October 10, allegedly showed two election workers entering the center after hours. One person carried a toddler while a device was inserted into a computer allegedly tied to Maricopa County’s ballot system. That made the key issue immediate: what was loaded onto the machine, and who approved it?
The newer recording was not available through the county’s public continuous livestream, according to the report. When Shelby Robinson of We The People USA Alliance brought it to county officials, the group said the response focused on how she obtained the footage and whether she had additional video.
The Gateway Pundit says it has repeatedly sought records connected to the alleged update, including documents requested through open-records filings by other interested parties. The requests include approval for the installation, any notice to or decision by the Secretary of State about additional logic and accuracy testing, plus certification and testing records.
The requests also seek the identity of the update’s author, terminal system logs covering the moments shown in the video, records of possible internet or system connections, and tracking documents for the USB devices. Those records would help establish who handled the equipment and whether required controls were followed.
Response below in your comments @DebbieLesko
So it’s public, I would like to see whatever forms authorized this update as well as the certification for the update. Any chain of custody records would be much appreciated as well.
Thanks in advance. You can post here, DM me or… https://t.co/oRZ3vma0lV
— CannCon (@canncon) October 14, 2026
Can you post the authorization forms from the SOS or whomever authorized and certified this update? I followed so you can DM if you’d like.
— CannCon (@canncon) October 14, 2026
On social media, CannCon asked Debbie Lesko for authorization paperwork, certification material and custody records. Later posts said responses were still awaited from Lesko and Mark Stewart, while offering to publish corrections if the concerns proved wrong.
Patiently waiting for a response from @DebbieLesko and/or @MarkStewart_AZ
Check comments in the post where you asked for question, Vice Chair Lesko.
And check your DMs, Supervisor Stewart.
Will gladly issue corrections if I’m wrong and give you a platform to provide the… https://t.co/BZANMvgmMw
— CannCon (@canncon) October 16, 2026
We The People USA Alliance then identified what it described as security failures visible in the recording. The group said port blockers and secure keys were not protected, USB use was not logged or tracked, and an employee appeared to leave the facility with a flash drive without documented custody. Those remain allegations from the group, not established findings in the supplied report.
A newly attained video of Maricopa County BTC room confirms that software was being installed on Oct. 7th. To date, Maricopa County has not produced any system logs or provided details on WHAT software was being loaded or that software has been certified and approved for use… pic.twitter.com/OxwVwY8ixM
— We the People USA Alliance (@WethePeopleAZA1) October 17, 2026
The alliance also asked whether the software was Runbeck Novas Duplication Software, whether it had been certified and approved before installation, and whether a file-naming problem shown in a demonstration would have required an update. The supplied report says Maricopa County had not produced system logs or explained what software was loaded.
Now, why would you not want cell phones in an "air-gapped" room? https://t.co/FnnLYKFqtp pic.twitter.com/4i97NMEoq6
— CannCon (@canncon) October 21, 2026
Why It Matters
This dispute matters because election equipment depends on controlled access, documented approvals and a reliable record of what changed. The videos raise questions about those safeguards, but footage alone cannot identify the software, establish who authorized it, or show whether any installation changed election operations. Those distinctions are important: suspicion and proof are not the same, and the missing records are central to resolving the gap.
The people affected include Maricopa County voters, election workers and officials responsible for explaining how certified systems are maintained. The wider issue is public confidence, which depends not only on secure procedures but also on clear answers when a disputed activity is shown on video. The open questions remain specific rather than abstract: what was installed, whether it was approved and tested, what the terminal logs record, and how the USB device was controlled after use. Until those questions are answered, the footage will continue to fuel competing interpretations instead of settling the dispute.
For now, the report’s central demand is straightforward: release the approval documents, certification records, system logs and USB tracking information. Those records would help establish whether the activity was authorized and what occurred on the terminal.
Source: The Gateway Pundit
